OP-ED: The Conquest of Ballots, Part Two: A Perilous Path
An initiative-based strategy is the most realistic path to electoral reform in the United States—it presents a revolutionary opportunity to smash the two-party system. By overhauling the way our elections work with pro-democracy reforms, we could position ourselves as formidable champions of democracy. But this strategy would still encounter serious legal and financial challenges. Many states not only require a tremendous number of signatures for an initiative to qualify for the ballot, but also have distribution rules mandating that they be collected in many different counties or congressional districts. Some states only allow initiatives for constitutional amendments, while others only allow them for ordinary legislation. There are often requirements that each initiative address no more than one issue, and limits to the number of articles in the state’s constitution that they can change. In this daunting maze of regulations, signature drives alone can cost millions of dollars. Subsequent campaign expenditures often exceed $10 million.
These problems raise a vast array of strategic questions that could never be adequately explored in a single article:
- Should we push our reforms incrementally, or all at the same time?
- If we do push our reforms all at once, should they be placed on the ballot as individual initiatives, or be bundled together in a single package?
- How can we raise the funds necessary to mount credible campaigns?
- Can we always rely on volunteers as Voters Not Politicians did in Michigan, or will paid signature collectors sometimes be necessary?
There are no easy answers to these questions, but if DSA or another socialist organization chooses to adopt this strategy, it will have to grapple with them regardless. We will need a flexible approach that can be adapted to each state’s political context and regulatory limitations. Only two things seem clear: first, that we should generally gain experience organizing initiatives at the local level before we attempt them at the state level; and second, we cannot win electoral reform all by ourselves—we will need to find allies willing to provide additional support to our project. This may entail partnerships with a wide variety of existing third parties, as well as elements of organized labor. Coalitions of this type will not form overnight; it will take years of work to bring them together. We must maintain our independence every of the way, working closely with other organizations without compromising on our basic principles.
The initiative strategy also has geographic limits. Because only 24 states have an initiative process, in the other 26 our road to victory will be more complicated. To succeed, we will need to employ a wide variety of tactics. We should strive to win municipal-level electoral reforms in every city, since even small local breakthroughs will help us gain momentum. We should also be willing to run socialist candidates in the primaries of both major parties, and use these campaigns to publicly confront politicians who reject electoral reform. Hopefully these efforts, combined with victories in states that do allow ballot initiatives, will cement popular enthusiasm for our reform program. The tide of public opinion would force politicians in states without initiatives to give way or face primary challenges, electoral defeats, mass protest, and constant upheaval.
In areas where our movement is strong and the Democrats are politically dominant, we could also use the spoiler effect to our advantage. Far ahead of a given election, we could publicly announce a plan to run our candidates on an independent socialist ticket, even if it splits the left-liberal vote. Democrats would receive a clear warning: pass electoral reforms before the election arrives, or face the natural consequences of plurality voting. If they ignored our warning and then lost to Republican candidates, we would not shoulder the blame. Instead, we would remind the public that the Democrats had a chance to block the Republican victory and refused. Disillusioned liberal voters would radicalize and break with the Democratic Party, benefiting socialists in the long run despite the short-term electoral consequences.
Beating Democrats with the “spoiler stick” will not work everywhere, and it has considerable limitations. It could bring an end to the plurality system that produces vote-splitting, but it would not win more transformative changes like proportional representation. Even so, the tactic could energize our movement and force our demands onto the political agenda if we learn to use it strategically.
Elements of the spoiler stick tactic have already worked in the real world. In Maine, Democrats grew tired of the constant vote-splitting that put Paul LePage in power and realized that there was only one way to eliminate it. They backed a ballot measure to implement instant-runoff voting in nearly all of the state’s elections, and in 2016, it passed with 52% of the vote. It was the first statewide law to abolish plurality voting—and an encouraging sign that initiatives can create a democratic mandate for electoral reform.
But the initiative effort in Maine also illustrates the greatest obstacle to electoral reform: capitalist sabotage. Despite the clear majority support for the initiative, Maine Republicans have staunchly opposed instant-runoff voting, which led the state’s Supreme Court to issue a nonbinding opinion in 2017 claiming that most of the initiative’s provisions are unconstitutional. This opinion gave members of the state legislature, including some wary Democrats, an excuse to pass a bill that effectively repealed the initiative. Only another initiative, signed by over 80,000 people, was able to block this bill by subjecting it to a veto referendum at the state’s recent primary elections. On June 12th, Maine voters decided once again to save instant runoff—but the court opinion has ensured that it will only be used in the state’s federal elections.
Reform efforts in other parts of the country have been met with similar obstruction. In 2008, 65% of Sante Fe, NM voters passed an initiative for instant-runoff voting in their local elections. The city government responded by simply ignoring them, with the Democratic mayor even claiming that they “voted for the concept…without understanding what it meant.” Local officials dragged their feet on the initiative for years, refusing to implement it until an activist group sued and the New Mexico Supreme Court ordered them to back down. In March this year, Sante Fe voters used the new system for the first time—after waiting for a decade.
From Michigan to Maine
Socialists can anticipate all of these pitfalls and take steps to address them. We can write our reforms carefully to minimize legal obstruction, promote them effectively so that voters overwhelmingly support them, and sue whenever officials refuse to implement them. But even if we make all the right decisions, there is no way around it: electoral reform will face formidable opposition from political elites. Occasionally we may wring concessions from both parties of capital, but in general, they will unite in bitter hostility to any movement for increased democracy—especially if it is championed by the radical left.
The conquest of ballots will not be bipartisan. Every step of the way it will bring conflict, and if we want to win, we can’t shy away from it. Instead, we must embrace the battle of democracy, using it to radicalize working people and forge an independent party of the Left.
From Michigan to Maine, the lesson is clear: the path to electoral reform is narrow, but it’s still open.
And it’s time for us to take it.
By Jonah Martell (For part one, click here.)
The Perils on the Path
An initiative-based strategy is the most realistic path to electoral reform in the United States, and raises the revolutionary potential of smashing the two-party system. By overhauling the way our elections work with pro-democracy reforms, we could position ourselves as champions of democracy. But an initiative-based strategy would still face serious challenges—the most obvious being legal and financial. Many states not only require a tremendous number of signatures for an initiative to qualify for the ballot, but also have distribution rules mandating that they be collected in many different counties or congressional districts. Some states only allow initiatives for constitutional amendments, while others only allow them for ordinary legislation. There are often requirements that each initiative address no more than one issue, and limits to the number of articles in the state’s constitution that they can change. In this daunting maze of regulations, signature drives alone can cost millions of dollars. Subsequent campaign expenditures often exceed $10 million.
These problems raise an array of strategic questions:
- Which states should we target first?
- Should we push our reforms incrementally, or all at the same time?
- If we choose to push our reforms all at once, should they be placed on the ballot as individual initiatives, or be bundled together in one package?
- How can we raise the funds necessary to mount credible campaigns?
- Can we always rely on volunteers, as Voters Not Politicians did in Michigan, or will paid signature collectors sometimes be necessary?
There are no easy answers to these questions, but if DSA or another socialist organization chooses to adopt this strategy, it will have to grapple with them regardless. We will need a flexible approach that can be adapted to each state’s political context and regulatory limitations. Only two things seem clear: first, that we should generally gain experience organizing initiatives at the local level before we attempt them at the state level. And second, we cannot win electoral reform by ourselves—we will need to find allies willing to provide additional support to our project. This may entail partnerships with a wide variety of existing third parties, as well as elements of organized labor. These coalitions will not form overnight; it will take years of work to bring them together. Every step of the way, we must maintain our independence, working closely with other organizations without compromising on our basic principles.
The initiative strategy also has geographic limits. Because only 24 states have an initiative process, in the other 26, our road to victory will be longer and more difficult. To succeed, we will need to employ a wide variety of tactics. Even small local breakthroughs will help us gain momentum, so we should strive to win municipal-level electoral reforms in every city. We should also be willing to run socialist candidates in the primaries of both major parties, using these campaigns to publicly confront politicians who reject electoral reform. Hopefully, these efforts, combined with victories in states that do allow ballot initiatives, will cement popular enthusiasm for our reform program. The tide of public opinion would force politicians in states without initiatives to give way or face primary challenges, electoral defeats, mass protest, and constant upheaval.
In areas where our movement is strong and the Democrats are politically dominant, we could also use the spoiler effect to our advantage. Far ahead of a given election, we could publicly announce a plan to run our candidates on an independent socialist ticket, even if it splits the left-liberal vote. Democrats would receive a clear warning: pass electoral reforms before the election arrives, or face the natural consequences of plurality voting.
If they ignored our warning and then lost to Republican candidates, we would not shoulder the blame. Instead, we would remind the public that the Democrats had a chance to block the Republican victory and refused. Disillusioned liberal voters would radicalize and break with the Democratic Party, benefiting socialists in the long run despite the short-term electoral consequences.
This tactic would not work everywhere, and it has considerable limitations. It could help us bring an end to plurality rule, but it would not win more transformative changes like proportional representation. Even so, if we use it strategically, it could energize our movement and force our demands onto the political agenda.
Elements of the tactic have already worked in the real world. In Maine, Democrats grew tired of the constant vote-splitting that put Paul LePage in power and realized that there was only one way to eliminate it. They backed a ballot measure to implement instant-runoff voting in nearly all of the state’s elections, and in 2016, it passed with 52% of the vote. It was the first statewide law to abolish plurality voting, and encouragingly, it was won by the initiative process—just as proposed in this article.
But the initiative effort in Maine also illustrates the greatest obstacle to electoral reform: establishment sabotage. Despite the clear majority support for the initiative, Maine Republicans have staunchly opposed instant-runoff voting, which led the state Supreme Court to issue a non binding opinion claiming that most of the initiative’s provisions are unconstitutional. This opinion gave members of the state legislature, including some wary Democrats, an excuse to pass a bill that effectively repealed the initiative. Only another initiative signed by over 80,000 people was able to block this bill by subjecting it to a veto referendum at the state’s upcoming primary elections. On June 12th, Maine voters will decide whether to save instant runoff again or let it die in the legislature.
Reform efforts in other parts of the country have been met with similar obstruction. In 2008, 65% of Sante Fe voters passed an initiative for instant-runoff voting in their local elections. In response, the city government simply ignored them, with the Democratic mayor even claiming that they “voted for the concept…without understanding what it meant.” Local officials dragged their feet on the initiative for years, refusing to implement it until an activist group sued and the New Mexico Supreme Court ordered them to back down. In March this year, Sante Fe voters used the new system for the first time—after waiting for a decade.
From Michigan to Maine
We can write our reforms carefully to minimize legal obstruction, promote them effectively so voters are eager to support them, and sue whenever politicians refuse to implement them. But even if we make all the right decisions, there is no way around it: our reform program will face formidable opposition from political elites. Occasionally, we may wring concessions from both parties of capital, but in general, they will unite in bitter hostility to any movement for increased democracy—especially if it is championed by the radical left.
The conquest of ballots will not be bipartisan. Every step of the way, there will be conflict, and if we want to win, we cannot shy away from it. Instead, we must embrace the battle of democracy, using it as a catalyst for mass radicalization and mobilization.
From Michigan to Maine, the lesson is clear: the path to electoral reform is narrow, but it’s still open.
And it’s time for us to take it.